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JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues for appeal in this matter, and their accompanying standards of review
are:
1)

In imputing income, did the Trial Court hold the requisite hearing and
make the requisite finding that Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed? The applicable statute (78-45-7.5(7)(a) mandates that a
hearing be held and afindingmade that a parent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed before income can be imputed to a parent.
In this case, there was no hearing held addressing the issue of whether
Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, and no finding
made that the Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
There was no evidence presented to permit the court to make such a
finding. The Trial Court must abide by the statute authorizing the court
to impute income; failure to abide by the law is reversible error. The
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Trial Court must make findings on all material issues; failure to do so
constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen. 757 P.2d 476, 478
(Utah App. 1988).
Findings made by trial court regarding amount of income to impute
to party in divorce action for purposes of child support award do not
become relevant until after court determines, as threshold matter, that
income should be imputed because party is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed. Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The Trial Court failed to enter any findings required under Section
(7)(a). The findings on the whole are insufficient if they omit critical
findings required by the statute. Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108, 1111
(Utah App. 1990).

Failure of the Trial Court to consider and make

findings on statutorily mandated factors is itself an abuse of discretion.
Jeffries v. Jeffries. 752 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah App. 1988).
Findings on the whole are insufficient if they omit critical finding s
required by statute governing imputation of income for purpose of child
support. Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1993).
It is well established that where a statute expressly requires a Trial
Court to make a threshold finding before taking specified judicial action,
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the Trial Court abuses its discretion if it proceeds without first making the
legislatively mandated finding. See Hill v. HilK 841 P.2d 722, 724-25
(Utah App. 1992).
Trial court's decision to impute income to husband for purposes of
child support and alimony awards without making any explicit finding
that husband was underemployed or any subsidiary findings that pointed
to such determination have been made implicitly was substantial departure
from procedure mandated by Legislature and could not be justified merely
as failure to parrot exact language prescribed by statute. Hall v. HalL 858
P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1993).
In imputing income, did the Trial Court impute income based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history,
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for person of similar
backgrounds in the community, as required by statute? Appellant
additionally argues that even assuming the propriety of imputing
additional income to him, the Trial Court incorrectly fixed the amount of
income to impute as set forth in Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.5(7)(b) (1992).
That section provides that:
If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be
based upon employment potential and probable
3

earnings as derived from work history, occupation
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the communityAppellant specifically assigns error to the court's failure to
adequately address "employment potential and probable earnings/1 The
statute authorizing the courts to impute income mandates to the courts that
income be imputed based upon employment potential and probable
earnings. The Trial Court arbitrarily imputed income and then stated it
was based upon current and historical earnings in spite of the fact that
current earnings and actual historical earnings were far below the imputed
amount. The Trial Court failed to follow the prescribed procedure
mandated by the Legislature. There was no evidence presented to impute
income based upon defendant's "employment potential and probable
earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community."
The Trial Court made no findings explicit or implicit, concerning
"prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community"
as required by Section (7)(b), but arbitrarily ruled that Defendant has
imputed earning capacity in an amount at least equal to that of the
Plaintiff.
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Trialjbourt's failure to make findings, explicit or implicit,
concerning prevailing earnings for persons in community with similar
backgrounds to husband in order to correctly fix amount of income to
impute to husband for purposes of child support, assuming propriety of so
imputing income to husband, was improper. Court of Appeals could not
disregard statutory mandate to make such findings solely on basis of
litigant's unique circumstances. Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1020 (Utah App.
1993)
The Trial Court must make findings on all material issues; failure to
do so constitutes reversible error

Andersen v. Andersen. 757 P.2d

476,478 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The court is not at liberty to utilize the authority of the statute to
impute income, and then ignore the specific requirements prescribed for
the use of such authority.
If on remand trial court finds, that husband was voluntarily
underemployed, it was then required to make findings as to prevailing
earnings for persons of backgound similar to that of husband in
determining amount of income to impute to husband for purposes of child
support. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1021 (Utah App. 1993).
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Whether the Trial Court's basis for imputing income is based on nonrelevant, erroneous, and controverted evidence that is insufficient to
support the findings? The findings made by the Trial Court regarding the
amount of income to impute, per Section (7)(b), do not become relevant
until after it determines, as a threshold matter, that income should be
imputed because the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed,
as required by Section (7)(a). Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1019 (Utah App.
1993).
Because evidence in divorce action was not clear, uncontroverted,
and capable of supporting only finding in favor of judgement imputing
income to husband for purposes of determing child support, trial court's
decision to impute income could not be affirmed on basis of undisputed
evidence in record; parties hotly contested adequacy of husband's efforts
to find more gainful employment and at least some evidence suggested
that husband's current, diminished income level resulted not from his
personal perference or voluntary decisions, but instead resulted from
events beyond his control. Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1993).
Accordingly, because the evidence in this case is not "clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
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judgment," we cannot affirm on the basis of undisputed evidence in
record. Kinkella v. Baugh. 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes are determinative of the issues herein:
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7-5(6):
Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under
Subsection (7).
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.5(7):
(a)

Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the
parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is
held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed.

(b)

If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be
based upon employment potential and probable
earnings as derived from work history, occupation
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the procedures mandated by law for the imputation of
income to a parent for the purposes of calculating such parent's child support
obligation pursuant to the Utah Child Support Guidelines,

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Appeal is taken from the Decree of Divorce of the Fourth Judicial
District Court for Wasatch County, State of Utah, entered by Judge Ray M.
Harding, and filed on September 28, 1993.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The Trial Court calculated Appellant's child support obligation based
upon income imputed to the Defendant/Appellant at an amount equal to that of
the Plaintiff. There was no hearing held on the issue, nor were any findings
made that Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. A finding
was made that Defendant has imputed earning capacity in an amount at least
equal to that of Plaintiff.
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RELEVANT FACTS
1)

The Trial Court imputed income to Defendant in an amount equal to
Plaintiffs income.

2)

Court imputed income to Defendant based on historical earnings, present
earnings, and the equity value in two homes generated by his work.

3)

Defendant's current income and historical income was presented at trial
and is considerably lower than Plaintiff's income.

4)

Plaintiff had already received clear title to one of the homes almost three
years prior to trial in a distribution of assets; giving her the entire equity
value of the home, free and clear of any incumberances.

5)

The equity value in the home the Plaintiff received was created from over
a year's work from the Defendant in building the home.

6)

The mortgage on Plaintiff's home was paid off from equity from the sale
of the parties' prior home. That equity also came from Defendant's labor.

7)

The division of property was not equal. Plaintiff received a
disproportionate share of equity in the home. Credit is due Defendant for
his share of the equity that Plaintiff received in the home.

8)

Defendant moved from out of state to live and work with/near his
children.

9

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT 1:

IN IMPUTING INCOME, DID THE TRIAL COURT HOLD THE
REQUISITE HEARING AND MAKE THE REQUISITE FINDING
THAT APPELLANT WAS VOLUNTARILY UNEMPLOYED OR
UNDEREMPLOYED?

The Trial Court did not hold the requisite hearing and make the requisite
finding that Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
It is necessary and appropriate that, in imputing income to an individual for the
purposes of calculating child support based upon the Utah Child Support
Guidelines, the statute authorizing the same be strictly complied with in order to
prevent injustice. The Court does not have the liberty to alter that which is
required by statute. The Court abuses its discretion if it proceeds without first
making the legislatively mandated finding.
POINT 2:

IN IMPUTING INCOME, DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPUTE
INCOME BASED UPON EMPLOYMENT POTENTIAL AND
PROBABLE EARNINGS AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE?

The Trial Court did not impute income based upon employment potential
and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar background in the community as
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required by statute. Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in imputing income due
to its failure to comply with the requirements of the law,
POINT 3:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURTS BASIS FOR IMPUTING
INCOME IS BASED ON NON-RELEVANT, ERRONEOUS, AND
CONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS?

The Trial Court's finding Number 5 states that imputed earning capacity
was based upon historical earnings, present earnings, and the equity value in the
two homes generated by his work.
The Trial Court states this as a basis to impute earning capacity, when in
fact, evidence presented at trial contradicts and does not support the conclusion.
The Defendant's current income and historical income is considerably lower
than Plaintiff's income. In addition, Plaintiff had already received clear title to
one of the above-mentioned homes almost three years prior to trial in a
distribution of assets, giving her the entire equity value of the home, free and
clear of any incumberances. Clearly the Trial Court has abused its discretion in
not considering the facts and evidence presented to support its findings.
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
POINT 1:

IN IMPUTING INCOME, DID THE TRIAL COURT HOLD THE
REQUISITE HEARING AND MAKE THE REQUISITE FINDING,
AS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE STATUTE, THAT
APPELLANT WAS VOLUNTARILY UNEMPLOYED OR
UNDEREMPLOYED?

The legislature has specifically authorized the Courts to impute income to
a parent for the purposes of calculating a parent's child support obligation under
the Utah Child Support Guidelines; UCA 78-45-7.5(6) states:
Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7).
In granting such authority, however, the legislature has required that, in
order for a Court to impute income to a parent, a hearing must be held and a
finding must be made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed; UCA 78-45-7.5(7)(a) states:
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent
stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing held is held and a
finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed.
In fact, the applicable statute specifically mandates that: "Income may not
be imputed to a parent..." {emphasis added} unless the requirements of the
statute are complied with. Accordingly, by statute, the Court "may not" impute
12

income unless a hearing is held and an appropriate finding is made. The Court
has no discretion to do what is specifically unauthorized by the law.
In the instant case, there was no requisite hearing held to determine
whether the Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Further,
there was no finding made, as is required by statute, that the Appellant was
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Accordingly, by law, the court has
no discretion and can not impute income to the Appellant. The applicable
statute is addressed specifically to the court and is clear in its mandate; the court
is not at liberty to break or ignore the specifically mandated requirements of the
law. Accordingly, the Trial Court had no authority to impute income to the
Appellant.
It is well established by the courts that the failure to comply with the law
is against the law. The statute specifically states: "Income may not be imputed
to a parent unless..." The requirements of the law must be recognized and
upheld by the legal system itself or the "presumption of [the] validity" of the
laws themselves lose their merit. The validity of the laws would lose their merit
if the guardian of the law, the courts, ignored the requirements of the laws.
Unless, and until, that statute is determined to be unconstitutional, it applies; and
it mandates to the court that: "Income may not be imputed to a parent unless..."
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"the requirements are met.
The requirements in the statute are a mandate—they are not discretionary;
the Trial Court, in such a matter, has no discretion. If this court can say that it
is not an abuse of discretion to ignore the demands of the law as authorized by
the people through its legislature, then there is, nor can there be, any external
limitation on the discretion of the court. The court would simply be a law unto
itself. The court would be free to act as it pleases and to pick and choose those
laws with which it desired to comply and those laws which it desired to
disdainfully ignore. If we say that we are a society governed by the laws made
by the people through its legislature, and no one is above the law—not even
judges in carrying out the law—only then, can we say that we are a government
OF THE PEOPLE.
This failure of the Trial Court to hold the statutorily mandated hearing
and make the required finding is reversible error. I can see no greater abuse of
discretion by the court than to have the court disdainfully ignore the explicit
statutory mandate of the law that a hearing and a finding in such matters are
non-discretionary. The statute specifically states that: "Income may not be
imputed to a parent unless,,," the specific requirements are complied with by the
Trial Court,
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The potential injustice which can occur in improperly imputing income is
tremendous. The Legislative Branch has gone through all of the trouble to
specify the requirements it has established to seek to protect the improper use of
this tremendous power. We complain of the Legislative Branch because it
doesn't provide enough guidance to the court in applying its laws; then, when it
makes the effort to spell it out for the court's use and eliminate the guesswork,
the court disregards what the legislature has so painstakingly put together for the
court's behalf.
The court has no discretion in the applicability of this requirement which
requirement is directed to no other entity than the court The requirement in the
statute is a mandate-not within the realm of discretion; in this instance, the
court has no discretion.
In the precedent case, Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), the
Court of Appeals has sent the proper message that the law must be complied
with in imputing income to a parent. In the precedent case, as in this case, the
Trial Court did not hold a hearing on the issue, nor did the Trial Court make the
requisite finding that the Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed. Accordingly, by law, the Trial Court could not impute income
to the Appellant. The Court of Appeals agreed. Because the findings before us
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do not include any findings to the effect that Appellant was voluntarily
underemployed, they are statutorily insufficient. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018
(Utah App. 1993).
In upholding the law, the Court of Appeals should reverse the lower
court's determination and require that child support be calculated on Defendant's
actual income according to the child support guidelines mandated by the
legislature.
POINT 2:

IN IMPUTING INCOME. DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPUTE
INCOME BASED UPON EMPLOYMENT POTENTIAL AND
PROBABLE EARNINGS AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE?

Once the requisite hearing has been held and the required finding made
that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, the court is obligated
to impute income "based upon employemnt potential and probable earnings."
The legislature, in authorizing the courts to impute income, has mandated the
method to be utilized in imputing income; the statute 78-45-7.5 (7)(b) reads:
If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work
history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for
persons of similar backgrounds in the community.
The statute prescribes two factors which must be determined in order to
impute income. First, that income is to be imputed based upon "employment
16

potential"--which means the likelihood of such individual being employed if
such individual were voluntarily unemployed, and in what capacity would such
individual likely be employed, or, in the alternative, in what capacity should
such individual be employed if such individual were voluntarily underemployed.
Second, that income is to be imputed based upon the "probable earnings11
of such an individual-which means, in other words, what earnings would such
an individual likely earn while employed in such capacity.
The legislature has specified and, thereby, limited the factors which are to
be considered in deriving "employment potential and probable earnings". In
determining "employment potential and probable earnings," the Trial Court is
required, by statute, to derive its conclusions from: "work history, occupational
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the
community/1 The legislature has specified that these three factors must be
addressed by the courts in deriving "employment potential and probable
earnings." Again, the statute specifies that the consideration of such factors is
not optional and within the discretion of the court, but mandates that imputed
"income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings as
derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for
persons of similar backgrounds in the community." {emphasis added}
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The statute is not vague, and it is not ambiguous; there is no difficulty in
reading exactly what the statute provides and exactly what the statute requires.
The court is not at liberty to exclude that which is specifically required by law.
The court is not at liberty to utilize the authority of the statute to impute income
and, then, ignore the specific requirements prescribed for the use of such
authority.
The legislature has granted the authority only as delineated by the statute-otherwise, the court has no authority; in this instance, the legislature has gone
into great detail and specifically articulated the requirements mandating in what
manner and under what specific conditions that authority is to be used. The
purposes of these requirements have been addressed by the legislature and are
mandated in order to protect the rights of the people in the interests of justice.
The court is not at liberty to alter, amend, or ignore these mandated
requirements—unless, and only to the extent that, such mandates are in some
way unconstitutional. The courts are to apply the law to specific instances—not
to ignore or modify the law. This statute as passed by the legislature OF THE
PEOPLE is the LAW and is to be properly honored and upheld by the courts in
the administration of justice; there can be no justice if the law is not complied
with under the guise of ''discretion".
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In the instant case, there was no finding that the Defendant was
unemployed. There was no evidence presented at trial that the Defendant was
voluntarily underemployed- There was no finding made in the instant case that
the Defendant was volunarily underemployed- The statute requires that the
imputed income "be based upon employment potential and probable earnings-"
There was no evidence that imputed income was in any way indicative of
employment potential and probable earnings- The evidence shows that imputed
income was far greater than current income and historical income.
In Woodward v- Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 477(Utah App- 1991), the court
stated:
If we are to determine whether the evidence adduced at trial
supports the trial court's findings, the findings must embody
sufficient detail and include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show
the evidence upon which they are grounded.
* * *

There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to marshal the evidence
when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be
meaningfully challenged as factual determinationsThe burden of proof is, obviously, on the party seeking to ascribe income
to another. All of the factors required by statute to be used by the court in
deriving an individual's "employment potential and probable earnings" must be
presented before the court by such party to allow the court to properly consider
all of the specified factors required in deriving the "employment potential and
19

probable earnings" of an individual against whom the income is sought to be
imputed.
There was no evidence presented or finding made that such imputed
income was indicative of Defendant's "employment potential and probable
earnings/1 No evidence was provided indicating Defendant's occupational
qualifications would permit him to obtain more lucrative employment. No
evidence was presented which would substantiate that earnings imputed to the
Defendant as being consistent with prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community. The Plaintiff simply failed to establish its
burden of proof and no findings were made by the court. This was true in the
instant case as well as the precedent case, Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah
App. (1993), where the Court of Appeals upheld the mandated statute and
states:
[If] "the Trial Court finds that appellant was voluntarily
underemployed, it must then make findings as to prevailing earnings
for persons of backgrounds similar to that of appellant, as required
by Section (7)(b), in determining the amount of income to impute".
POINT 3:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S BASIS FOR IMPUTING
INCOME IS BASED ON NON-RELEVENT, ERRONEOUS. AND
CONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS?
20

The Trial Court erred in imputing income without first determining that
Defendant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed as required under
(7)(a). Additionally, in fixing the amount of income to be imputed, the Trial
Court failed to follow statutory directives in assessing his employment potential
and probable earnings as required under (7)(b). Thus, the findings are not
adequate to impute income. Because the findings are inadequate and irrelevant,
Point 3 becomes unnecessary. Even so, the Appellant wishes to point out the
injustice and arbitrary nature of the Trial Court in imputing income.
The Trial Court's finding Number 5 states that imputed earning capacity
was based upon historical earnings, present earnings, and the equity value in the
two homes generated by his work. In the transcript on pages 31-33,
Defendant's annual earnings were read as stated under oath in the interrogatories
and shown in Exhibit #4. The annual earnings for the prior eight years (1984
through 1991) showed historical income averaged less than $10,000 per year.
Current earnings for the year 1992 were less than $5,000, With this undisputed
evidence presented at trial, historical earnings and present earnings cannot be
used as a basis to justify imputing an income of $25,000 per year. The
evidence does not support the findings.
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The findings also state that the imputation was based on the equity value
of two homes. The Plaintiff had already received clear title to one of the abovementioned homes almost three years prior to trial in a distribution of assets,
giving her the entire equity value of the home, free and clear of any
incumberances. The equity value in the home the Plaintiff received was created
from over a year's work from the Defendant in building the home. The
mortgage on the Plaintiffs home was paid off from equity from the sale of the
parties' prior home. That equity also came from Defendant's labor in building
that home.
The Trial Court was also aware of this as the Plaintiff testified on p. 34 of
the transcript, starting on line 8,
Q. and you're also aware, are you not, that that home is valued at
approximately $100,000?
A. Yes.
Q. And you received that home fully — I mean you received all
interest in that home without any mortgage payments?
A. That's right.
Q. So you haven't made any mortgage payments on that home,
have you?
A. No.
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The Trial Court was also made aware of the unequal distribution of assets
when the Defendant deeded the home to the Plaintiff and paid off her mortgage.
Quoting from Defendant's testimony on p. 48 in the transcript on line 22,
A. I received the $59,000 for giving her the deed to the house that
she resides in.
Q. Your understanding is she got a house worth $100,000 and you
got $59,000 net from that sale?
A.Yes.
The Trial Court was made aware of the fact that the Plaintiff received all
of the equity derived from Defendant's efforts, allowing the Plaintiff to live
comfortably without a house payment. Credit is due the Defendant for his share
of the equity that the Plaintiff received in the home, not the reverse. With this
knowledge, the court used this equity given to the Plaintiff as a basis to impute
a greater child support payment, also to be given to the Plaintiff. This cannot
be justified. Clearly, the Trial Court has abused its discretion. The facts and
evidence presented contradict the Trial Court's findings.

CONCLUSION
The potential for injustice and the potentially devastating ramifications of
an improperly imputed income are tremendous. In recognition of the potential
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for abuse, the legislature has mandated procedures and requirements that must
be complied with in order to protect the citizens of our community from
devastating abuses. These mandated procedures are not discretionary*
The Trial Court made several errors in the instant case. The Utah Appellate
Court should use this opportunity to correct those errors as it has done
previously in the precedent-setting case Hall v. Hall to ensure that they are not
perpetuated. Appropriate matters should be reversed by this court. This court
must once again consider the message it wishes to disseminate regarding the use
of this powerful tool for imputing income. The use of such a tool must be
based upon the specific requirements mandated by the statute creating that tool
to ensure the prevention of the abuse of such authority.
It is imperative that, in utilizing the authority granted to it by the
legislature, the Trial Court follow the procedures and comply with the specified
requirements mandated by the legislature in granting such authority.
The issues presented have been clearly established in previous precedent-setting
case law, i.e., Hall v. Hall. I would only ask the court to apply such case law to
the instant case, and again reverse the Trial Court's decision for lack of
adequate findings.
The Appellant wishes to thank this court for its review of these issues
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which have significant and long-lasting consequences on Appellant's life. In the
interest of truth and justice, Appellant respectfully requests this court to reverse
the Trial Court's decision.
The Appellant also wishes to apologize for his shortcomings in presenting
this case pro se. Appellant has no legal expertise in these matters, but is doing
so because of his strong compulsion to correct the gross error and injustice that
has occurred. The Appellant cannot afford the great sums of money needed for
professional legal counsel. This prohibitive cost would have made an appeal
impossible.
The Appellant must confess that most of the material presented has been
taken from the precedent case Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993).
Without this material and guidance, Appellant would have been unable to
present his case without professional legal representation. With this in mind,
Appellant sincerely hopes the court will focus on the facts and principles of the
matter, and will be tolerant of Appellant's shortcomings and lack of legal
expertise.
S I G ^ ^ A N D D / g ^ D this J?Y~£

day of May 1994.

Vincerif J. Villella, II
Attorney Pro Se/Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief
was mailed first-class to:
Wendy Hufhagel, Attorney for PlaintiffyRespondent, 190 North Main Street,
Suite 200, Heber City, UT 84032.
SIGNER ANDJpATED this / ^

Vincerff J. Villella, II

day of May 1994.

Wendy Hufnagel USB 1568
Attorney for Plaintiff
190 North Main Street, Suite 200
Heber City, Utah 84032
Telephone (801)654-5700
Facsimile (801)654-5701
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUSAN MARY VILLELLA,
Plaintiff,

*

Judge Ray M. Harding

=vs=

*

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VINCENT JAMES VILLELLA II,
Defendant.

*

Civil No. 6621

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Fourth
District Court for trial; the Plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney, Wendy
Hufnagel; the Defendant appearing in person and by his attorney, Richard Nemelka; the
Court having heard and considered the testimony of Plaintiff and of Defendant, having
reviewed and considered the various exhibits offered in the course of the trial, and the Court
having heretofore having conducted in chambers interviews of the minor children; and the
Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now makes the following Findings of
Fact:
[1] Plaintiff is a bona fide resident of Wasatch County, State of Utah, and has
1

been for more than three (3) months immediately preceding the commencement of this
action for divorce.
[2] Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having intermarried January
18, 1964, in Idaho Falls, Idaho.
[3] Seven children have been born as issue of this marriage, five of whom
remain minors, to-wit: David Anthony, born September 4, 1975; Daniel John, born July 2,
1977; Lisa Marie, born October 19,1978; Maria Christine, born February 13,1981; and Sara
Jean, born July 16, 1982.
[4] The Court having interviewed the children and considered all of the other
evidence in this case determines that it is in the best interests of the minor children that
Plaintiff be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children David Anthony,
Lisa Marie, Maria Christine and Sara Jean, and that Defendant be awarded the care,
custody and control of the minor child Daniel John, subject to the non-custodial parent's
right of visitation at reasonable times upon reasonable notice.
[5] Defendant's historical earnings since 1988 are not indicative of his
historical earnings. Defendant is a licensed contractor, and in the past has also been a
licensed contractor. He has had sufficient earnings to acquire a substantial estate, has over
the past three years built two homes and created substantial equity in both. Based upon his
historical earnings, his admitted present earnings, and the equity value in the two homes
generated by his work, the Court finds that Defendant has imputed earning capacity in an
amount at least equal to that of Plaintiff, who is employed as a school teacher with a gross
2

income of two thousand and eighty-three dollars ($2,083.00) per month.
[6] It is reasonable therefore that Defendant should be ordered to pay to
Plaintiff the sum of three hundred and fifty-seven dollars ($357.00) per month commencing
with the month of January, 1993, and continuing monthly thereafter, one-half of which shall
be due on or before the fifth day of each month, and one-half of which shall be due on the
twentieth day of each month. No child support shall be awarded for any arrearage prior to
January, 1993.
WHEREFORE HAVING MADE and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact,
the Court now reaches the following Conclusions of Law:
[1] Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from Defendant upon the
grounds of irreconcilable differences, said Decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony
heretofore existing between the parties and restoring each to the status of a single person,
same to become final upon entry in the Register of Actions.
[2] Said Decree should incorporate the foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED THIS £J

day of ^

^

and ninety-three.

3

, nineteen hundred

Approved as to form:

NOTE:
Defendant's attorney was not
able to review and approve
Findings and Degree because
they were never sent to him
as certified by Plaintiff's
attorney.

Richard S, Nemelka
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
IN COMPLIANCE WITH Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration, I do
hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law was mailed, postage prepaid, to Richard S. Nemelka, Attorney for Defendant, 2046
Ease 4800 South, Suite 103, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, this /ffif&y of April, nineteen
hundred and ninety-three.

Wendy Hufhage
Attorney /toy Plaintiff
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Alaska court's conclusion." Gale v. State,
792 P.2d 570, 588 (Wyo.1990); Jimenez v.
State, 105 Nev. 337, 775 P.2d 694, 697
(1989); State v. Gorton, 149 Vt. 602, 548
A.2d 419, 421 (1988); People v. Raibon, 843
P.2d 46, 49 (Colo.App.1992), See e.g. State
v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 809 P.2d 455,
462 (1991) (concurring opinion); State v.
Spurgeon, 63 Wash.App. 503, 820 R2d 960,
961-63 (1991); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d
201, 208 (Miss.1988). Absent legislation or
precedent from the Utah Supreme Court,
we do not believe it would be appropriate to
require, by judicial fiat, that all statements
taken of a person in custody be recorded or
transcribed. Everette, 135 IlLDec. at 479,
543 N.E.2d at 1047.
Although, in accord with other courts,
we refrain from requiring recording of interrogations under the Utah Constitution,
we note several policy reasons for recording interrogations. These include avoiding
unwarranted claims of coercion and avoiding actual coercive tactics by police. In
addition, recording an interrogation may
show the "voluntariness of the confession,
the context in which a particular statement
was made, and . . . the actual content of
the statement." Williams, 522 So.2d at
208.
Miranda Warnings and the
Utah Constitution
Finally, defendant claims that regardless
of the evolution of voluntariness requirements under the federal constitution, the
Elstad doctrine should be rejected under
our state constitution.5 Defendant argues
that the state constitutional standard is
stricter than the federal constitution, and,
therefore, provides him greater protection.
Specifically, defendant urges us to reject
the federal interpretation of Miranda requirements as reflected in Elstad and other
cases, and retain what he regards as the
integrity of the Miranda decision as a matter of state law. Defendant also argues
5.

Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution provides
in relevant part that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." Article I, § 12 of the Utah
Constitution provides, "The accused shall not be
compelled to give evid ce against himself."

for extension of the Miranda doctrine by
means of the Utah Constitution.
[13,14] Although the state constitutional issue was properly raised before the trial
court, we need not analyze and address
every issue on appeal. State v. Carter,
776 R2d 886^ 888 (Utah 1989). We are
concerned that a separate state standard
might generate confusion in this area and
agree that "there is no value in being different merely for the sake of the difference." State v. Kell, 303 Or. 89, 734 P.2d
334, 336 (1987). Therefore, we decline at
this time to develop a separate constitutional standard governing admissibility of confessions under the Utah Constitution.6
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err under the
United States or Utah Constitutions in denying defendant's motion to suppress his
post-Mrarato confession. We therefore
affirm defendant's conviction.
ORME and GARFF, JJ., concur.

Virginia B. HALL, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Blaine D. HALL, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 920052-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 10, 1993.
In divorce action, the Fourth District
Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, J.,
ruled that "(w]e do not find, nor has defendant
identified, principles, precedents or criteria that
persuade us to adopt a different rule . ..
'[where] unwarned questioning "did not abridge
respondent's constitutional privilege . . . but departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down bv this Court in Miranda to safe-
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distributed marital property between parties and imputed income to husband for
purposes of calculating alimony and child
support Husband appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) trial court
was required to deduct wife's contribution
out of her inheritance from proceeds of
sale of marital home prior to dividing proceeds between parties; (2) trial court's failure to make findings to effect that husband
was voluntarily underemployed precluded
finding that imputation of income to husband was proper; (3) trial court's failure to
make findings, explicit or implicit, concerning prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds to husband in community
before calculating amount of income to impute to husband was improper; and (4)
wife was not entitled to attorney fees on
appeal.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Divorce <3=»235, 252,1
Court of Appeals accords trial court
considerable discretion in determining financial interests of divorced parties.
2. Divorce <3=>239, 253(4)
Trial court abuses its discretion in determining financial interests of divorced
parties when it fails to enter specific, detailed findings supporting its financial determinations; findings are adequate only if
they are sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose steps
by which ultimate conclusion on each factual issue is reached.
3. Divorce <S=>252.5(1)
Trial court was required to divide proceeds from sale of marital home equally
after first subtracting amount necessary to
reimburse wife's contribution from her inheritance or to enter findings supporting
unequal distribution that resulted when
court first divided proceeds and then subtracted wife's contribution from husband's
half of proceeds; trial court made no findings as to any exceptional circumstances
which took case out of presumptive rule of
equal distribution of marital property and
warranted repaying wife's inheritance sole-

ly out of husband's portion of equity in
parties' home.
4. Divorce <3=>253(2)
Once court makes finding that specific
item is marital property, law presumes that
it will be shared equally between parties
unless unusual circumstances, memoralized
in adequate findings, require otherwise.
5. Divorce <s=»239, 307
Trial court's decision to impute income
to husband for purposes of child support
and alimony awards without making any
explicit finding that husband was underemployed or any subsidiary findings that
pointed to such determination having been
made implicitly was substantial departure
from procedure mandated by Legislature
and could not be justified merely as failure
to parrot exact language prescribed by
statute. U.CJU953, 30-3-10.2(2Xa), 7 8 45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5(7Xa).
6. Divorce <£*307
Findings made by trial court regarding
amount of income to impute to party in
divorce action for purposes of child support
award do not become relevant until after
court determines, as threshold matter, that
income should be imputed because party is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7.5(7)(a, b).
7. Parent and Child <s^3.3(6)

Findings on the whdfe ate insufficient
if they omit critical findings required by
statute governing imputation of income for
purpose of child support. U.C.A.1953, 7 8 45-7.5(7)(a, b).
8. Divorce <s=287, 312.7
Because evidence in divorce action was
not clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only finding in favor of judgment imputing income to husband for purposes of determining child support and
spousal support, trial court's decision to
impute income could not be affirmed on
basis of undisputed evidence in record;
parties hotly contested adequacy of husband's efforts to find more gainful employment and at least some evidence suggested
that husband's current, diminished income
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level resulted not from his personal preference or voluntary decisions, but instead
resulted from events beyond his control.
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3),
78-45-7.5(7)(a, b).
9. Divorce <S=>286(2), 312.6(3)
Finding that husband was voluntarily
underemployed could not properly be implied in divorce action for purposes of determining child support and spousal support, even though trial court found that
husband was currently earning less than he
had previously earned, inasmuch as there
were no subsidiary findings showing that
trial court actually found that person with
husband's abilities could be earning more
in relevant market U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5(7)(a, b).
10. Divorce <3=>287, 312.7
Even given controverted evidence,
Court of Appeals could affirm trial court's
decision to impute income to spouse in divorce action for purposes of child support
and spousal support, absent outright expression of statutorily mandated finding, if
absent findings can reasonably be implied;
unstated findings can be implied if it is
reasonable to assume that trial court actually considered controverted evidence and
necessarily made finding to resolve controversy, but simply failed to record factual
determination it made. U.C.A.1953, 30-310.2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5{7Xa, b).
11. Divorce <3=>239, 307
Where court formulates detailed subsidiary findings of fact which underlie finding of underemployment for purposes of
imputing income to party in divorce action
on basis of which child support and spousal
support are determined, and which, by
themselves, show steps by which court arrived at its apparent conclusion that party
was underemployed, court's decision to impute income will not be invalidated solely
on ground that finding of voluntary underemployment was not couched in exact language of statute; this is especially true
since finding on ultimate issue of voluntary
underemployment is in reality more like
legal conclusion and is more meaningfully
made if supported by underlying findings

of historical fact. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5(7)(a, b).
12. Trial <3=>395(1)
In many cases, where court fails to
phrase findings in exact language of statute, findings nevertheless reflect methodical and extensively detailed treatment of
facts, which is often more insightful and
helpful on appeal than shorter, more cursory recitation of exact statutory language
would be; such approach frequently promotes more meaningful appellate review
by providing appellate court with insight
into steps taken by trial court in arriving at
its decision.
13. Appeal and Error <3=>931(3)
Findings may not be implied when an
ambiguity of facts make such assumption
unreasonable.
14. Divorce <3=>239, 307
Trial court's failure to make findings,
explicit or implicit, concerning prevailing
earnings for persons in community with
similar backgrounds to husband in order to
correctly fix amount of income to impute to
husband for purposes of child support, assuming propriety of so imputing income to
husband, was improper, even though husband's unique position as independent computer consultant, trained in unusual computer language, might render meaningful

eomp2ri§on of hu§band'§ income with thst
of other computer programmer/analysts
difficult; Court of Appeals could not disregard statutory mandate to make such findings solely on basis of litigant's unique
circumstances.
U.C.A.1953,
78-457.5(7)(b).
15. Divorce <s=>237, 306
Statute applicable in calculating imputed income for purposes of determining
child support and spousal support in divorce action did not require comparison
with persons of exactly same background
to determine amount of imputed income,
but court was to evaluate earnings with
persons of similar backgrounds; thus, with
respect to husband in unique position as
independent consultant, trained in unusual
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computer language, at minimum, trial
court was required to undertake some effort to evaluate employment market for
computer programmers/analysts in general, and then make its best effort to adjust
for husband's unique skills. U.C.A.1953,
78^5-7.5(7Kb).
16. Divorce <$=>287, 312.7
If on remand trial court finds that
husband was voluntarily underemployed, it
was then required to make findings as to
prevailing earnings for persons of backgrmind §imikf to tkzt 6f Imt&nd in determining amount of income to impute to husband for purposes of child support and
spousal support awards. U.C.A.1953, 7845-7.5(7Xa, b).
17. Divorce <$=»224
Award of attorney fees to wife in divorce action was proper, where wife had
legal custody of all nine minor children, one
of whom was autistic and required extra
attention, and wife presently had no training or experience which would allow her to
work outside home.
18. Divorce <s=*225
Wife was not entitled to attorney fees
on husband's appeal from trial court's decision in divorce action, where except for
comparatively minor issues, husband prevailed on major issues in dispute and secured remand and reconsideration of issues.
19. Costs e=>252
When appeal involves multiple issues,
party receiving attorney fees below need
not prevail on every issue in order to be
awarded fees on appeal.

Richard M. Hutchins, Provo, for defendant and appellant
Craig M. Snyder and Leslie W. Slaugh,
Provo, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME,
JJ.

ORME, Judge:
Appellant, Blaine Hall, appeals, inter
alia, the trial court's order distributing
marital property between the parties and
imputing income to appellant for purposes
of calculating alimony and child support.
We reverse for lack of adequate findings
and remand.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] This court accords the trial court
considerable discretion in determining the
financial interests of divorced
parties.
Alfredv. Alfred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah
App.1990). Although "the court's 'actions
are entitled to a presumption of validity/ "
id (quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d
1055, 1056 (Utah App.), cert denied, 765
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)), we cannot affirm
its determination when the trial court abuses its discretion. AUred, 797 P.2d at 1111.
The trial court abuses its discretion when it
fails to enter specific, detailed findings supporting its financial determinations. See
id Findings are adequate only if they are
"sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Id. (quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah
App.1988)). See also Sukin v. Suki?i, 842
P.2d 922, 924 (Utah App.1992) (detailed
findings are necessary to determine whether trial court has exercised its discretion in
a rational manner).
Appellant raises a number of issues on
appeal, some of which have no merit and
require no discussion. Accordingly, we see
no reason to engage in exhaustive treatment of the facts surrounding the parties'
divorce. We recite only the pertinent facts
in the course of treating the issues that
have merit.
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
[3] During their marriage, the parties
constructed a home in Alpine, Utah. Prior
to or during the construction of the home,
appellee, Virginia Hall, received from her
father's estate a total of $21,000. Of this
sum, $6,000 was used as a down payment
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on the home, and an additional $15,000 was
contributed toward its construction.1 During the divorce proceedings, the marital
home was sold. After payment of the existing mortgage obligation, real estate commissions, and other costs of sale, the parties realized a total of $52,403.88 in net
equity from the sale of the home. As is
typical, the trial court ordered that the net
proceeds be divided equally between the
parties.2 The court then deducted from
appellant's share certain late fees and delinquent interest in the amount of $192.60.
Next, without explanation or explicit recognition that appellant's separate funds were
being used to reimburse appellee's contribution to the marital estate, the trial court
ordered that $21,000 of the remainder of
appellant's share of the equity be applied to
reimburse appellee the funds from her inheritance which were used in the purchase
and construction of the parties1 home. Appellant was therefore left with net proceeds of approximately $5,000,3 and appellee received approximately $47,000.
Appellant claims the trial court abused
its discretion in ordering that appellee's
inheritance be reimbursed solely from his
portion of the equity in the home. Rather,
appellant argues, the trial court should
have returned appellee's inheritance of
$21,000 from the total equity of approximately $52,000, and then distributed the
remainder of the equity equally between
the parties. Appellee's contribution of her
separate funds to the marital estate would
thereby be repaid from the marital estate,
and each party would have then been presumptively entitled to half of the approximately $31,000 remaining home equity, or
roughly 515,500.
[4] In Burt r. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166
(Utah App.1990), this court observed that

trial courts must distribute property between the parties to a divorce in a fair,
systematic fashion. See id. at 1172 & n.
10. The Burt court noted that the trial
court should "first properly categorize the
parties, property as part of the marital
estate or as the separate property of one or
the other. Each party is presumed to be
entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Id. at 1172. The Burt court continued:
But rather than simply enter such a decree [automatically], the court should
then consider the existence of exceptional circumstances and, if any be shown,
proceed to effect an equitable distribution in light of those circumstances
Id. Thus, under Burt, once a court makes
a finding that a specific item is marital
property, the law presumes that it will be
shared equally between the parties unless
unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, require otherwise. See
also Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah
App.1992) (premarital property and inheritances are viewed as separate property,
and, normally, equity requires that each
party retain the separate property brought
to the marriage).
While conceding that the trial court's
property division did not result in an equal
division of the equity, appellee claims the
trial court was not obligated to distribute
the equity in the home equally. See Newmeyer v. Neunneyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 n.
1 (Utah 1987) ("fn determining whether a
certain division of property is equitable, ...
the relative abilities of the spouses to support themselves after the divorce are pertinent to an equitable ... division of the
fixed assets of the marriage."). Appellee

1. The testimony of appellee and her mother
established the separate nature of these funds.
Appellant does not dispute the separate nature
of the funds, nor does he claim that any commingling of these funds with the marital estate
destroyed their separate nature.
2.

The proceeds from the sale of the parties'
home u e r e deposited into a trust account which
accrued interest at the rate of $3.67 per day. At
the time the trial court entered its findings of

fact, the approximate net equity was $52,741.52.
After subtracting $592.26, which was applied
toward payment of a delinquent water bill, the
court was left with $52,149.26, which it divided
equally between the parties.
3.

Appellant received exactly $4,882.03 after "repaying" $21,000 to appellee. The net a m o u n t
due him v.as applied in full to his delinquent
child support and alimony.
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contends that in reimbursing her inheri- judge an opportunity to enter findings suptance from appellant's share of the equity, porting the unequal distribution, or, in the
the trial court took into account her special alternative, to divide the proceeds from the
circumstances, i.e., her lack of education sale of the home equally after first suband work experience, and the fact that the tracting the amount necessary to reimneeds of the parties' autistic child and two burse appellee's contribution. See Burt,
pre-school age children precluded appellee 799 P.2d at 1170, 1172.
from seeking employment outside the
home. Appellant counters that these conIMPUTATION OF INCOME
cerns were abundantly addressed by means
of child support and an award of permaSeveral years ago, while employed in the
nent alimony.
computer business in California, appellant
We recognize the power of the trial court earned a salary of $55,000. Appellant later
found employment in Utah as a computer
to effect an equitable distribution of propconsultant and software developer and
erty by considering both parties' "contribuworked in that capacity for at least the last
tions during the marriage and their circumthree years of the parties' marriage. Apstances at the time of the divorce." Id. at
pellant's gross earnings listed on his in1278. However, as this court held in Burt,
come tax returns for 1988, 1989, and 1990
"the court's division of the estate cannot
averaged in excess of $100,000 per year,
stand undisturbed when we are not prewith average monthly gross earnings in
sented with sufficient findings to demonexcess of $8,500.4
strate that the court's ruling comports with
established law." 799 P.2d at 1172.
About ten days before trial, appellant
started a new job in Vancouver, WashingFrom all that appears, the court made a ton, at a salary of $40,000 per year. At
simple conceptual error in providing for the trial, appellant requested that the court's
repayment of appellee's inheritance. The child support and alimony determinations
trial court made no findings as to any be based on his current $40,000 per year
exceptional circumstances which took this income level rather than on his historical
case out of the presumptive rule of Burt income of approximately $100,000 per
and warranted repaying appellee's inheri- year.5 On the basis of the evidence introtance solely out of appellant's portion of duced at trial as to appellant's income, and
the equity in the parties' home. Such an noting the marked disparity between appelunequal distribution of the parties* marital lant's $40,000 salary at the time of trial and
property' makes no sense in the absence of his income over the last three years of his
findings justifying the decision, see Wal- marriage, the trial court concluded that the
ters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah App. only way to accurately gauge appellant's
1991), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah income for purposes of determining his
1992), especially since appellee did not seek support obligations was to rely on the histhis result on any particular basis and torical earnings of appellant.
where appellee's lack of education and the
special needs of the children do appear to
The court adopted rather detailed findhave been thoroughly dealt with in the ings of fact based on the evidence adduced
award of permanent alimony and child sup- at trial, which established that appellant's
port, which we do not disturb. Absent average historical income over the three
findings that would justify departure from and one half years prior to trial amounted
the presumptive rule of equal distribution, to $98,498.75 per year, with a rrionthly avwe reverse and remand to give the trial erage gross income of $8,208.21.
4.

During the divorce proceedings, the trial court
also received evidence as to the deposits made
by appellant to his credit union account in Los
Angeles, California. That account balance to
tailed approximateh $96,000 in 1990.

5.

Interestingly, in proposed findings submitted
to the court just a few days before tiial, appel
lant included a finding stating he had an in
come of $66,000 per year.
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Appellant challenges the trial court's rul- inappropriate or not in best interest of tl
ings regarding his child support and alimo- child as required by Utah Code Ann. § 1\
ny obligations insofar as the trial court 45-7.2(3) (1992)); Throrison v. Thronso
based these obligations on appellant's his- 810 P.2d 428, 433 (Utah App.) (court abus<
torical income rather than on his income at its discretion by awarding joint legal cust
the time of trial. Appellant's primary ar- dy without first determining that both pa
gument in this regard is that the trial court ents agreed to the order as required t
erred in imputing income to him without Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(2)(a) (1989;
explicitly determining that he was volun- cert denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
tarily unemployed or underemployed as re- careful review of the trial court's finding
quired under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45- reveals not only the absence of any explic
7.5(7)(a) (1992). Additionally, he makes a finding that appellant was underemployed
subsidiary claim that in fixing the amount but also a lack of subsidiary findings thi
of income to be imputed to appellant, the point to such a determination having bee
trial court failed to follow statutory di- implicitly made. Thus, the court's a]
rectives in assessing his "employment po- proach cannot be justified merely as a fai
tential and probable earnings" as required ure to parrot the exact language prescribe
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(b) by the statute, but is instead a substantia
(1992).
departure from the procedure mandated b
the Legislature.
A. Propriety of Imputation
[5] In order to evaluate the merit of
appellant's first imputation argument, we
must determine whether the trial court's
decision to impute income was supported
by adequate findings in light of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7Xa) (1992), which reads:
"Income may not be imputed to a parent
unless the parent stipulates to the amount
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding
made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed."*
While we agree with appellee that section (7)(a) does not specifically require a
trial court, in making a "finding" of underemployment, to parrot the exact language
of the statute, it is well established that
where a statute expressly requires a trial
court to make a threshold finding before
taking specified judicial action, the trial
court abuses its discretion if it proceeds
without first making the legislatively mandated finding. See Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d
722, 724-25 (Utah App.1992) (court abused
its discretion by departing from child support guidelines without first finding that
following the guidelines would be unjust,
6.

Although in briefing, appellant seems to have
claimed the tnal court erred in failing to hold a
separate hearing limited to determining appellant's income for purposes of imputing income
pursuant to section 78-45-7.5(7)(a), he conceded at oral argument that holding such a

[6] The court's decision is by no mean
devoid of detailed factual findings. Indeec
the trial court entered commendably d(
tailed findings concerning appellant's hu
torical income, his present income, and hi
occupational qualifications. However, th
extensive detail apparent in the court'
findings of fact was pertinent to factor
required under section 78-45-7.5(7)(b)—th
section detailing factors to consider in ar
riving at the amount of income to impute
The findings made by the trial court re
garding the amount of income to impute
per section (7)(b), do not become relevan
until after it determines, as a threshoh
matter, that income should be imputed be
cause the parent is voluntarily
unem
ployed or underemployed, as required b>
section (7)(a). We do know from the find
ings that appellant now earns considerably
less than he has in the recent past. We
can only guess at whether this state oi
affairs stems from appellant's volition or,
as he contends, from the simple fact that
his once-coveted computer expertise in a
narrow field of business has been rendered
hearing in a case like the instant one would be
pointless. We note that in Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, A80 (Utah App. 1991), this
court upheld the trial court's imputation of income to the wife despite the trial court's failure
to hold a separate hearing on the matter.
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all but obsolete by changes in industry and
technology.
[7] The fact that the trial court entered
findings required by section (7)(b) does not
alter the fact that the trial court failed to
enter any findings required under section
(7)(a). Thefindingson the whole are insufficient if they omit critical findings required by the statute. Allred v. Allred,
797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App.1990). See
also Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P.2d 909, 911
(Utah App.1988). Because the findings before us do not include any findings to the
effect that appellant was voluntarily underemployed, they are statutorily insufficient
[8] The trial court's decision to impute
income may nonetheless be affirmed if the
failure to have made the missing findings
can be viewed as harmless error. One
method is to show that "the undisputed
evidence clearly establishes the factor or
factors on which findings are missing."
Allred, 797 P.2d at 11II. In the case before us, at least some evidence suggests
that appellant's current, diminished income
level resulted not from his personal preference or voluntary decisions, but instead
resulted from events beyond his control,
For example, appellant claims his clients
did not renew lucrative consulting contracts, and apparently the only job opportunity available to him was the job he eventually accepted at $40,000 per year. Moreover, the parties hotly contest the adequacy
of appellant's efforts to find more gainful
employment Accordingly, because the evidence in this case is not "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment," we cannot affirm on the basis of undisputed evidence in the record. Kinkella v. Baugh,
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983).
7.

In m a n y cases, where a court fails to phrase
findings in the exact language of the statute, the
findings nevertheless reflect methodical and extensively detailed treatment of the facts, which
is often more insightful and helpful on appeal
than a shorter, more cursory recitation of the
exact statutory language would have been.
Such an approach frequently promotes more
meaningful appellate review by providing the
appellate court with insight into the steps taken
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[9-12] Furthermore, even given controverted evidence, we could affirm the trial
court's decision to impute income, absent
outright expression of the statutorily mandated finding, if the absent findings can
reasonably be implied. Unstated findings
can be implied if it is reasonable to assume
that the trial court actually considered the
controverted evidence and necessarily
made a finding to resolve the controversy,
but simply failed to record the factual determination it made. See Slate v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 n. 6 (Utah
1991). See also Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App.1991) ("A
finding may be implied if it is clear from
the record, and therefore apparent upon
review, that the finding was actually made
as part of the tribtmars derision.^. Thus,
where the court formulates detailed subsidiary findings of fact which underlie a finding of underemployment, and which, by
themselves, show the steps by which the
court arrived at its apparent conclusion
that a parent is underemployed under section. 78-45-7.5(7)(a), the court's decision to
impute income will not be invalidated solely
on the ground that the "finding" of voluntary underemployment was not couched in
the exact language of the statute. This is
especially true since a "finding" on the
ultimate issue of voluntary underemployment is in reality more like a legal conclusion and is more meaningfully made if supported by underlying findings of historical
fact.7
[13] Findings may not be implied, however, when the "ambiguity of the facts"
makes such an assumption unreasonable,
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788. This court recently held that we will not imply any
missing finding where there is a "matrix of
possible factual findings" and we cannot
by the trial court in arriving at its decision. Cf.
LaSal Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl
Quality,
843 P.2d 1045, 1047-48 (Utah App.1992) (contrasting c o m m e n d a b l e detail of findings m a d e
by administrative law judge with sparse, conciusory findings made by department head and
r e m a n d i n g for m o r e adequate findings "to m o r e
fully articulate" reasons for department head's
decision).
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ascertain the trial court's actual findings.
Sec Adams, 821 P.2d at 6.
A finding that appellant was voluntarily
underemployed cannot properly be implied
in this case. Although the trial court
found that appellant is currently earning
less than he was previously, that isolated
finding does not answer the critical question of whether the drop in earnings was
voluntary. Rather, appellant's current
earnings, as compared to his historical income, is merely one element in the matrix
of factual issues affecting the ultimate
finding of whether appellant is underemployed. Many critical questions are left
unanswered: What are appellant's abilities? Is appellant's current salary below
the prevailing market for a person with his
abilities? Are there any job openings for a
person with appellant's abilities? At a minimum, the trial court must determine appellant's employment capacity and earnings
potential—which it failed to do even in its
determination of the amount to impute under section'(7)(b)—before it could logically
conclude that he is, in fact, underemployed.
Inasmuch as there are no subsidiary findings showing that the trial court actually
found that a person with appellant's abilities could be earning more in the relevant
market, we cannot imply a finding that
appellant is underemployed. We accordingly reverse the trial court's determination that appelant is underemployed and
remand for evaluation of that issue and the
entry of appropriate findings.
B. Amount of Imputed Income
[14] Appellant additionally argues that
even assuming the propriety of imputing
additional income to him, the trial court
incorrectly fixed the amount of income to
impute as set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7.5(7)(b) (1992). That section provides that "[i]f income is imputed to a
parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earn8. Appellant contends his once-lucrative market
niche has been lost due to the ability of his
former customers to now do the work he had
previously done using their own employees. Indeed, a company would be unlikely to expend
extravagant amounts for independent consult

ings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings
for persons of similar backgrounds in the
community." Id. Appellant specifically
assigns error to the court's failure to adequately address "employment potential and
probable earnings." Id. The point is well
made.
As previously noted, the trial court made
elaborate underlying findings regarding appellant's work history and prior earnings,
based on tax returns and bank records, and
occupational qualifications, based on his
employment history. Yet the court made
no findings, explicit or implicit, concerning
"prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community" as required by section (7)(b).
[15] Although appellant's unique position as an independent consultant, trained
in an unusual computer language, might
render meaningful comparison of appellant's income with that of other computer
programmer/analysts difficult, we cannot
disregard a statutory mandate solely on
the basis of a litigant's unique circumstances. The statute does not require a
comparison with persons of exactly the
same background, but instructs courts to
evaluate earnings "for persons of similar
backgrounds." Id. (emphasis added).
White an abundance of independent programmers might not inhabit the local market, surely computer programmers in diverse positions must be employed locally
under circumstances which would permit
some level of meaningful comparison. If
an adequate pool of consultant programmer/analysts cannot be discovered, employee programmers who engage in similar programming activities might provide a useful
comparison.8 At a minimum, the trial
court must undertake some effort to evaluate the employment market for programmers in general, and then make its best
ing services if it could utilize in-house programmers to accomplish the same goals less expensively. If appellant's premise is sound, employee programmers may well prove to be the only
reliable reference point.
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effort to adjust for appellant's
skills.

unique

[16] Accordingly, if upon remand the
trial court finds that appellant was voluntarily underemployed, it must then make
findings as to prevailing earnings for persons of backgrounds similar to that of appellant, as required by section (7)(b), in
determining the amount of income to impute.

atively minor issues we dismissed out of
hand, appellant prevailed on the major issues in dispute. He secured remand and
reconsideration of both the home equity
distribution and the imputation of income.
Appellee therefore is not entitled to attorney fees related to this appeal.
CONCLUSION

In allocating equity in the parties' home,
the trial court failed to make adequate
ATTORNEY FEES
findings to justify its departure from the
presumptive rule of equal distribution of
[17] Despite the fact that appellee has
property. We further agree with appellant
legal custody of all nine minor children, one
that the court erred by not making the
of whom is autistic and requires extra atstatutorily mandated findings that he was
tention, and despite the fact that she presunderemployed as a prerequisite to its deciently has no training or experience which
sion to impute income to appe)lanL If
wtiufcf affow ner to work outside the home,
upon remand for the forgoing issues, the
appellant argues that the court failed to
court adheres to its decision to impute inmake sufficient factual findings to support
come to appellant, it must consider "preits award of attorney fees to appellee. We
vailing earnings for persons of similar
include appellant's challenge to the trial
backgrounds in the community" in setting
court's award of attorney fees among those
the amount to impute. Finally, we leave
previously characterized as being without
undisturbed the trial court's award of atmerit and accordingly leave the award untorney fees to appellee, but refuse to
disturbed.
award fees to her for this appeal. We
accordingly
reverse and remand for further
[18,19] Appellee, on the other hand,
findings
consistent
with this opinion.
claims she is entitled to attorney fees on
appeal. "Generally, when the trial court
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.
awards fees in a domestic action to the
party who then substantially prevails on
appeal, fees will also be awarded to that
party on appeal" Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831
P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah App.1992). See also
Burt v, Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah
App. 1990). When an appeal involves multiple issues, the party receiving attorney
fees below need not prevail on every issue
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
in order to be awarded fees on appeal See
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App.
v.
1991) (party who "prevailed on the main
Eugene MONTOYA, Defendant
issue on appeal" received fees); Ostler v.
and Appellant.
Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah App.1990)
(party prevailing on child support issue, but
No. 920441-CA.
losing on issue of dividing retirement acCourt of Appeals of Utah.
count with nominal value, received fees).
In contrast to the instant case, Bell, LynAug. 12, 1993.
gle, and Ostler were all situations where
the party seeking attorney fees on appeal
prevailed on the most significant issues in
Defendant entered conditional plea of
controversy. Here, except for the compar- no contest in the Third District Court, Salt

